The fear of o¤shoring, particularly in services since 2000, has raised workers economic insecurity and heightened concerns over future economic globalization. Many have argued that globalization has exacerbated labor market turbulence increasing the demand for social insurance programs. The authors present a simple theoretical model establishing a connection between the threat of o¤shoring, economic insecurity, and the demand for social insurance. Data from the 1972-2006 General Social Survey to provides supporting empirical evidence.
Introduction
Trends in workers' perceived economic insecurity have moved closely with the unemployment rate over the past three decades (see …gures 1 and 2 ). However, since the mid 1990s the average level of economic insecurity has failed to trend downward with the unemployment rate. This apparent rise in insecurity has focused attention on future economic globalization. Rodrik (1997) , Scheve and Slaughter (2004) , and Traca (2005) , among others, …nd that higher levels of economic insecurity result from greater wage and employment volatility, which is a product of trade-induced increases in labor-demand elasticities. Moreover, Rodrik (1998) claims there is a positive relationship between increased economic integration and the size of the welfare state. Rodrik (1998) argues that the government can play a risk-reducing role, as workers exposed to higher levels of international trade are exposed to more labor market risk. This "risk" is essentially the higher volatility in wages and employment from a more elastic demand for labor. Traca (2005) …nds evidence to support this hypothesis. Slaughter (2001) , however, …nds "mixed [empirical] support" for the hypothesis that trade has contributed to increased labor demand elasticities. Furthermore, Iversen and Cusack (2000) …nd that changing welfare preferences can be explained by internal labor market transformations and not globalization. Panagariya (1999) directly refutes Rodrik's hypothesis. 1 Cusack , Iversen, and Rehm (2006) (henceforth CIR) focus on how labor market risk is related to preferences for redistribution. CIR use the popular International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and industry-level data to establish; which objective measures of insecurity (labor market indicators) determine preferences for redistribution; and whether objective measures are good predictors of subjective economic insecurity. 2 CIR …nd that in both cases labor market indicators are statistically signi…cant predictors of welfare policy preferences and perceived insecurity. The purpose of the second regression is, as CIR note, because "it is not obvious that people have a good idea about their actual exposure to risk" and, from a political economy standpoint, perceptions of risk should be more important in determining policy preferences. If voters'perceptions are overly pessimistic about the condition of the economy, they could demand government action, even if it is unnecessary. 3 On the other hand, Mughan (2007) …nds that "no form of [subjective] job insecurity has any impact on the support for enhanced social welfare provisions." Mughan's …ndings indicate it may not be safe to conclude that objective measures of insecurity are good estimates of perceived insecurity or that workers who believe they are exposed to more risk demand more social insurance. Obviously these con ‡icting results are data driven: CIR use 1970-2004 cross-national data, while Mughan uses two separate surveys, a 1995 U.S. survey and 1998 Austrailian survey. Fomenting the problem are signi…cant di¤erences in the questions used to estimate welfare policy preferences, which we will discuss later. Mughan concludes "despite these …ndings...the thesis [that insecurity determines welfare preferences] should not be rejected." However, recent work by Campbell, Carruth, Dickerson, and Green (2007) indicate that Mughan's results may hold water. 4 In light of the literature reviewed above, we use data from the 1972-2006 General Social Survey (GSS) that corresponds nicely with the survey data used by CIR and Mughan. With a few exceptions (Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998; Schmidt, 1999) , the GSS has not been fully utilized to study the issue of economic insecurity. We …nd that increased international exposure (speci…cally o¤shoring) has increased workers perceived economic insecurity. While this result is not 1 To summarize, Panagariya (1999) uses two popular trade models (the 2x2 H-O model and the speci…c-factors model) to demonstrate that the labor-demand curve many not need to be more elastic in an open economy than in a closed one.
2 CIR note that the ISSP does not contain a sample of respondents who are asked about both their own job security and about welfare policy preferences. Consequently, they run two seperate regressions and di¤erent samples of the data.
3 One possible reason to expect this result is that the media tends to portray the economy as being worse than the data indicate. For example see Blendon et al., (1997) . 4 Campbell et al. …nd that expectations data are additionally informative and contain useful private information for predicting future unemployment. This suggests that using an objective measure may produce misleading results.
surprising, this paper is the …rst, to our knowledge to reach this conclusion using U.S. data. Secondly, we …nd that workers who express higher levels of insecurity tend to demand that the government should; play a larger role in redistributing income from the rich to the poor; and spend more money on healthcare, welfare, and social security programs. Conversely, we …nd no evidence that insecure workers want the government to spend more money on education. The next sections set forth a simple theoretical model connecting o¤shoring, labor demand elasticities and the demand for social insurance. Section 3 reviews the GSS data and the construction of our variables. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy and results. The …nal section concludes and proposes some areas for future research.
Theory
Economic insecurity is most often understood as an individual's perception of the risk of economic misfortune (e.g. Dominitz and Manski, 1997) . Economic misfortune can be thought of as individual's inability to purchase goods and services or provide for their families, actions that primarily depend on their income. In reality, the majority of Americans do not earn their primary income from dividend payments or stock options, but rather from wages from labor income. We make the standard assumption that economic insecurity primarily stems from volatility in wages and employment, caused by volatility in the labor market. As a result, the …rst part of this section uses labor theory in conjunction with trade theory to review the argument that o¤shoring a¤ects economic insecurity via increases in industries'labor-demand elasticities. 5 The result that followsworkers susceptible to o¤shoring will express a higher probability of a job loss than workers in safe industries-is used in an expected utility model, in which workers'demand for wage insurance is a function of their expected probability of a costly job loss.
O¤shoring and labor market volatility
The e¤ect of increased globalization may be illustrated with a simple, perfectcompetition, industry-level labor demand model (e.g., Hamermesh, 1993) . Let an industry's own-price labor demand elasticity, n d j , consist of two parts, a scale e¤ ect (sn j ) and a substitution e¤ ect ( 1[1 s] j ):
where s is labor's share of industry j's total revenue; j is the constant-output elasticity of substitution between labor and all other factors of production; and n j is the product-demand elasticity for industry j's output market. n d j is de…ned as negative; s, j , and n j are positive. The scale e¤ect measures the change in the quantity of labor demanded after a wage change caused by a change in output. The substitution e¤ect tells us, for a given level of output, how much …rms substitute away from labor and toward other factors of production when wages rise. Both the scale and substitution e¤ects reduce the quantity of labor demanded when wages rise. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on the processes in which o¤shoring increases labor-demand elasticities via the substitution e¤ect. 6 Suppose an industry is vertically integrated with a number of production stages. Trade allows domestic …rms to lower production costs by o¤shoring work to foreign labor and importing intermediate inputs (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999) . Trade thus increases the number of factors that …rms can substitute in response to higher domestic wages, beyond simply domestic non-labor factors. Therefore, movement toward freer trade should increase the elasticity of substitution, j . Firms need not actually o¤shore jobs to increase j ; the potential of o¤shoring is su¢ cient (Slaughter, 2001) . Di¤erentiating (1) with respect to j shows that, as this substitutability increases, labor demand becomes more elastic (i.e., n d j becomes more negative):
Additionally, as s decreases the pass-through from j to n d j strengthens. As a result, we would expect to see higher wages generate larger changes in the quantity of labor demanded for industries with more capital intensive an production. 7 It can be easily shown 8 that higher labor-demand elasticities increase the volatility in wages and employment (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter, 2004) . Increased economic insecurity thus re ‡ects workers'response to the greater volatility in employment and wages within their industry (Rodrik, 1997) .
Expected utility model
Assume a workers' demand for social insurance is based on his desire to have the same level of consumption even if an adverse event, such as a costly job loss, befalls him. His expected utility is such that:
where p i is the probability worker i will experience costly job loss, W is i's income regardless of whether he experiences a costly job loss, 9 t i is the tax per 6 Scheve and Slaughter (2004) note two reasons for focusing on the substitution e¤ect; because it is direct (i.e., it places domestic workers in competition with foreign labor) and because other researchers (primarily Rodrik, 1997 ) have emphasized in theory its possible role in generating insecurity.
7 This is where the role of increasing automation a¤ects labor-demand elasticities. Increases in automation will reduce s, increasing the pass-through e¤ect. Replacing workers with computers will exacerbate the impact of trade on the labor-demand elasticity.
8 Let z denote the marginal product of labor; let w and e denote the percent change in wages and employment ,which are given by w = Rodrik (1997, p. 16) .
9 W consists of wage (salary and bene…ts) as well as non-wage income (wealth). This becomes an important consideration in our empirical model speci…cation, although not necessarily a critical assumption. dollar that i incurs for the government to provide him with wage insurance, i is total amount of salary (and bene…ts) lost if i loses his job and cannot …nd a job with similar pay and bene…ts, and b i is the amount the government will pay him if he does experience a costly job loss. Assume the government works on a balanced budget, such that expected pro…ts (E ) are
where there are no administrative costs and the taxes received equal the expected bene…ts paid out. Therefore, if the probability of costly job loss for worker i is 5% then t = 5 cents per dollar. Maximizing expected utility, where U = p C so
Maximizing (5) with respect to b i gives us the optimal level of social insurance for worker i is
This is to say worker i is willing to pay taxes at a level where the government assistance exactly o¤sets his loss of income and bene…ts if he experiences a costly job loss. It follows that consumption is equalized where
The problem of adverse selection occurs if we have two types of workers. One is susceptible to o¤shoring, with a probability p t of experiencing a costly job loss. The second group of workers is safe from o¤shoring and has a probability p n of costly job loss where p n < p t . Providers of social insurance know the proportions of the population that fall into each group but are unable to distinguish between the two groups of workers. Therefore the government must charge a tax rate t n on every worker; however t n < t t and the pro…ts earned on the two groups of workers are E n = t n b n p n b n = 0; and (8)
Where the government breaks even on the group of workers safe from o¤shoring, and since p t > p n , the government operates at a loss overall and therefore private social insurance would not be o¤ered by the free market. Using data from the Displaced Worker Survey from Kletzer (2007 , Tables 7  and 9 ), we can estimate the optimal tax rates and the cost of a wage insurance program for workers in tradable and nontradable industries. We calculate the percent of workers who will experience a costly job loss (p) as follows:
where u is the percentage of workers that remain unemployed after job loss, r is the job loss rate, and s is the share of workers that take a loss in earnings after re-employment. Table 1 shows that workers in tradable industries experience a greater decline in income when faced with job loss compared with those workers in nontradable industries. However, workers in tradable industries have slightly higher annual incomes than their counterparts. 10 From equation (7) we estimate the steadystate levels of consumption and the optimal tax rates. The model predicts that workers in tradable industries would be willing to pay 2.3 percent of their annual income in taxes in return for wage insurance, while workers in nontradable industries are willing to pay only 0.5 percent of their annual income in taxes. These conditions set the total cost of a wage insurance program at $31 billion.
The pitfall of this approach is that thep is the current proportion of workers who experienced a costly job loss and not the probability of future job loss, which raises the problem of adverse selection described above; the question noted by CIR, is also raised: Are objective measures good proxies for expectations? We address this issue in the following sections.
Data
Our data are from the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The survey is administered in February and March of each sample year, with the total number of respondents ranging from 1,468 to 2,832. Since 1994, the GSS has been conducted on a biannual basis. Respondents answer questions regarding their demographic information and opinions on a plethora of topics, including two questions about earnings and employment expectations, and a dozen questions about government spending. We use the responses from the two employment questions to measure perceived economic insecurity. So far as we are aware, this is the only large survey dataset for the United States that contains such questions.
Variables to capture workers'economic insecurity
The …rst question, which we label joblose, asks: "Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid o¤-very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?"The second question, which we label job…nd, asks: "About how easy would it be for you to …nd a job with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe bene…ts you now have? Would you say very easy, somewhat easy, or not easy at all?"
Figures 1 and 2 plot the percentage of respondents who believe it is likely and very likely they will lose there job (LIL) and believe it would be hard to …nd a new job over the sample period (HDF ). The …gures exhibit two notable patterns. First, workers'expectations about losing their job and …nding a new job have moved fairly closely with the unemployment rate. This pattern is consistent with CIR's …nding that labor market indicators are good proxies for perceived economic insecurity. Second, during the economic recovery of the 1990s and to a greater extent the recovery in the 2000s, workers were more pessimistic about both job loss and …nding a job than they were during the previous periods of relatively low unemployment in within the period of the 1970s and 1980s, this trend is highlighted by the growing divergence with the unemployment rate. This divergence, beginning around 2000 (speci…cally with LIL), may be a re ‡ection of; the heightened concerns about the potential of o¤shoring of "white collar" service jobs or; the increased (and more negative) attention the media has given to globalization (see Marks, Kalaitzandonakes, and Sonduru, 2006) .
We combine the answers of these two questions to de…ne a variable that measures whether workers believe they will su¤er a pay cut or extended unemployment as a result of job loss. Following Schmidt (1999), we de…ne a binary variable, costly job loss (CjL), as the fraction of respondents who said they were very or fairly likely to lose their job in the next year and also said it would not be easy at all to …nd another job with similar pay and bene…ts. We assume workers are indi¤erent between two jobs with similar pay and bene…ts, as both jobs would provide the same level of economic security. Although summarizing the survey's information in such categorical variables is far from ideal, there are few alternatives.
Variables to capture o¤shoring
Theory indicates that tradable industries will exhibit more-elastic labor demands, rasing labor-market volatility. According to the …ndings of Kletzer (2007) , this is exactly the case. Tradable industries have notably higher job-loss rates than those safe from o¤shoring; 0:126 compared with 0:058. Additionally, workers in tradable industries saw income loss of $5,453 compared with $2,003 in nontradable industries (as noted in table 1). These …ndings support the theory that workers in industries safe from o¤shoring will express signi…cantly lower levels of economic insecurity. Following the results of Jensen and Kletzer (2005) , we construct our o¤shoring variables. 11 To develop an empirical approach identifying work activities that can be potentially o¤shored, Jensen and Kletzer assume activities traded domestically can be potentially traded internationally, even if they currently are not. Using spatial clustering, they group industries and occupations into "Gini classes," where those industries and occupations with Gini coe¢ cients less than 0.1 are classi…ed as "Gini class 1"or nontradable. We base our construction of our two o¤shoring variables on their results. 12 The variable pIN D identi…es those industries in which activities can be o¤shored. Industries such as personal services (e.g., teeth cleaning) are coded as zero, or nontradable. There is no reason a dentist or hygienist would worry about their job being o¤shored. Other industries in which the work could feasibly be o¤shored are coded as 1.
Similar to our pIN D variable, we use Jensen and Kletzer's results to construct a variable pOC, identifying those occupations safe from o¤shoring (e.g., judges or physicians) and coding the variable as zero; those that can be potentially o¤shored are initially coded as 1. Certain occupational groups, such as administrative assistants, …nd themselves in safe industries, but are in an occupation that could be o¤shored.
Measuring skill speci…city
Between January 2000 and January 2006, over 3 million manufacturing jobs were destroyed while some 8 million new jobs were created in the service sectors of the economy. Transferable skills play an important role in workers'transitions from one industry to another. Some workers'skills are industry-speci…c, such as machine operators, while other workers have skills that are easily transferable across industries, such as management positions. Workers in occupations with more transferable skills should be less vulnerable to industry-speci…c shocks than workers with industry-speci…c skills. As it relates to our o¤shoring variables, workers with industry-speci…c skills would expect to see their human capital (and therefore wages) drop more after moving into a new sector than a worker in an occupation with skills that are less industry-speci…c (more transferable). Bardhan and Tang (2006) suggest calculating an occupational dispersion measure to proxy industry-speci…c skills. Occupations that are well diversi…ed across industries should exhibit lower levels of industry-speci…c skills compared with those occupations that are highly concentrated within one industry. They …nd that an occupation spread out across many sectors is less volatile in terms of wages and employment. We construct a normalized Her…ndahl-Hirshman Index, HHI n , to measure worker concentration within industries:
where s i;j is the share of respondents in occupation i in industry j, n is the total number of respondents, and HHI n i ranges from 0 to 1. Table 2 shows the average value of the HHI n i based on 19 major occupational groups for di¤erent time periods over the entire sample. All of the occupations tend to stay close to their 77-06 values, regardless of the time period. The last column in the table shows the results of Bardhan and Tang (2006) for 1999 and 2005 using the much larger BLS Occupational Projections and Training Data, which averages about 165; 000 employees per occupation. 13 Combining pOC and HHI n as follows,
1 3 The authors thank John Tang for graciously sharing his results with us.
The variable pOC addresses the nonlinearity in measuring the impact of o¤-shoring by occupation. For example, a judge or a priest may be in a highly concentrated occupation, but safe from o¤shoring. Therefore we would expect a respondent to express a high level of insecurity in the face of an industry-speci…c shock, such as o¤shoring, only if his speci…c job is prone to o¤shoring and is in highly concentrated occupation. Workers in safe occupations are coded as zero, and those prone to o¤shoring are measured by their level of transferable skills.
Individual …xed e¤ects control variables
Demographic control variables are likely to account for some of the variation among individuals'perceptions about their economic security. However, immeasurable and/or unobserved di¤erences that are speci…c to individuals may also matter. When answering the GSS survey question about …nding a new job, one respondent may believe he could …nd a new job paying 10 percent less with comparable bene…ts and answer "somewhat easy,"while another respondent may be in the same situation and say "not easy at all." Unlike the U.K. panel survey data used by Scheve and Slaughter (2004) and Campbell et al.(2007) , the GSS is a time series of cross-sections that does not track the same individual over di¤erent years. We are unable to control for individual-speci…c e¤ects using the standard practice. 14 However, we have auxiliary data from the GSS survey to approximate the existing individual bias beyond our demographic controls. Campbell et al. (2007) …nd that current expectations of unemployment are associated with prior experiences of unemployment. Similary, the GSS asks respondents a question about their past …nancial situation, speci…cally: "During the last few years, has your …nancial situation been getting better, worse, or has it stayed the same?" We code the respondents'answers to these questions with values ranging from 1 to 3, where 3 equals getting better. Using this coding, we construct the variable f Sit . Including this variable in our models allows us to approximate unobserved e¤ects that in ‡uence the respondents' answers to the economic insecurity questions. More speci…cally, f Sit can be thought of as a proxy for the past employment situation of the respondent. By de…nition we assume this variable is exogenous. Including this variable in our estimation produces more precise estimates, but by no means accounts for all the unobserved individual e¤ects that are possible in a panel structure.
Empirical strategy
In section 4.1, we analyze the pooled time series cross-section GSS data using probit models, so as to examine the variation in economic insecurity at the individual-respondent level. In section 4.2, we regress the estimated probabilities of a worker expressing costly job loss on the demand for social insurance, as to test the expected utility model results. Included in these regressions is a bias measure that …lters individuals sentiment toward government spending independent of labor market concerns.
Determinates of economic insecurity
In cases where the variable to be estimated is limited to a range of values and contains discrete responses, probit models are employed to provide the best estimation. Generally speaking, we specify a probit model with the same form as Aaronson and Sullivan (1998); Schmidt (1999) . However there are a few di¤erences; both authors include a vector of industry variables while our model includes the o¤shoring variables, and in light of the recent work by Campbell et al. (2007) we control for the respondents past …nancial situation. Table 3 reports the coe¢ cients and standard errors from the speci…cations that use CjL as the dependent variable. The results are reported relative to the base-case; white, male, age 25 to 39, who lived in the northeast in 1988 and worked in an industry and occupation safe from o¤shoring. For robustness purposes, the …rst four columns use di¤erent model speci…cations, which include year and regional e¤ects. The …fth column reports the base-case probability and the marginal e¤ects that correspond with the parameters estimated in our "preferred" model 4. This model controls for the respondents'past …nancial situation, f Sit. The marginal e¤ect corresponding to this variable indicates that a base-case respondent who indicated his past …nancial situation has been getting worse is 1.2 percent more likely to express fear of a costly job loss than a worker who believes his …nancial situation has been getting better. This …nding is consistent with Campbell et al. (2007) , who …nd that (for the United Kingdom) an additional 100 weeks of previous unemployment raises the probability of an employee feeling that future unemployment is "likely" or "very likely" by 4 percent. The coe¢ cient on the regional unemployment rate is consistently positive and signi…cant and indicates that a 1 percent increase in the regional unemployment rate will increase workers' perceived economic insecurity by 1.2 percent. This also supports CIR's conclusion that objective labor market indicators are good estimates of workers perceptions, although they may be systematically biased downward.
The variable that has the greatest impact on our insecurity measure is selfemployment. If the base-case respondent is self-employed, his probability of expressing costly job loss increases from 5 percent to around 9 percent. If an entrepreneur looses his job, in all likelihood he went out of business, so it is understandable why self-employed workers will express a greater fear of job loss.
The parameter estimates of our o¤shoring variables are quite robust across all model speci…cations. Our potential for o¤shoring variables, pIN D, pOC; and pOC are positive and signi…cant across all model speci…cations. Model 4 predicts that the probability that the base-case worker will express costly job loss if he works in a tradable industry and occupation would be approximately 7 percent, or 2 percent higher than the base-case. This lends support to our hypothesis that employees in industries and occupations safe from o¤shoring will express lower levels of job insecurity, and, moreover, that workers in highly diversi…ed occupations express less job insecurity.
Economic insecurity and the demand for social insurance
Using the base-case probabilities of costly job loss we can re-estimate the tax rates outlined in table 1. The probit model results indicate that the probability a worker in a tradable industry will express fear of costly job loss is 9.2 percent, compared with 6.7 percent in nontradable industries in 2004. These correspond to optimal tax rates of 2.45 percent and 0.88, respectively-which are slightly higher than the optimal tax rates estimated using the actual proportions of the population who experienced costly job loss. Suggesting that workers are, in fact, more pessimistic about their prospects of future job loss and are willing to pay higher tax rates than objective measures would indicate. On the aggregate, the federal government would incur annual costs of about $30 billion. The vast majority of the costs ($25.5 billion) are from providing wage insurance to workers in tradable industries. These number seem reasonable when compared with estimates by Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2006) that the lifetime loss by workers displaced from o¤shoring is about $50 billion per year.
While it may seem unreasonable to use the probability of a worker expressing fear of a costly job loss as the actual probability of costly job loss, we have two justi…cations for this claim. First, the number of workers that fear costly job loss should be a good approximation of the actual probability a worker will experience a costly job loss. Not all workers who fear costly job loss will actually lose their job; on the other hand, some workers will experience a costly job loss without predicting it. Our estimates of costly job loss for 2002 (8.3 percent and 6.6 percent) compare reasonably well to the proportion of workers who actually experienced costly job loss 2 years later. 15 Moreover, Campbell et al. (2007) …nd that expectations data are additionally informative and contain useful private information for predicting future unemployment, above and beyond observed objective variables. In light of a more desirable method of estimating the probability of a worker experiencing costly job loss we are left with using these estimated probabilities or the actual proportion of workers who experienced a costly job loss from the DWS.
Unlike the data used by Mughan (2007) , which encompasses only one year and two policy questions, 16 the GSS provides us with more questions that allow us to determine whether a link from increased insecurity to greater demands for social insurance truly exists. The GSS asks respondents if they believe the government ought to reduce income di¤erences between rich and poor by raising taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. This question is comparable to the question used by CIR. Additionally, the survey ask respondents their opinions on the amount of government spending directed toward education, social security, healthcare, and welfare programs. The mean values indicate that, with the exception of welfare, respondents would like to see the federal government direct more money toward dealing with inequality and providing more for education and social security and healthcare.
Model speci…cation (1) in tables 4 through 8 presents the linear regression results between the government spending variables and our estimated probabilities of expressing costly job loss,p i = prob (CjL = 1). Model speci…cation (3) includes the respondents wealth on the right-hand side. 17 Unfortunately the GSS asked respondents only to report their wealth in 2006; we therefore present the results using only 2006 data. Where the entire sample was available, model speci…cations (1) and (2), the results are qualitatively similar.
As expected by the Rodrik (1997) hypothesis, workers with higher levels of insecurity tend to believe the government should dedicate more resources toward reducing inequality. Contrary to Mughan (2007) : Higher levels of insecurity are positively correlated with increased spending for welfare and healthcare. Quite surprising, a higher probability of a respondent expressing costly job loss is not correlated with an increase in that respondents support for more money for education. In general, the results lend some support to our hypothesis; however we cannot make any strong assumptions about this link because of the unobserved bias, as we cannot control for individual …xed e¤ects. High-income individuals may be less likely to support government programs because they believe the tax burden will fall on them. Or more insecure individuals tend to have lower skills, and education and earn a lower wage and therefore are more likely to support increased government spending. Conversely, individuals may have an ideological bias where they consistently believe the government spends too much or too little money. Mughan (2007) uses party a¢ liation as a proxy for this bias; political party a¢ liation is obviously a function of labor market considerations, among other things, raising an endogeneity problem.
In order to control for the inherent bias in respondents answers, we exploit the data-rich GSS. In addition to questions about funding for social insurance type programs, the GSS asks respondents their opinions about the level of spending to do the following: protect the environment, help cities, reduce crime, reduce drug addiction,provide foreign aid, improve roads, and maintain national parks. 18 We use these questions as instruments to measure the respondents' inherent bias for more or less government spending. None of these variables are correlated with workers insecurity, and theoretically they should not be correlated with employment outlook, but they are highly correlated with the social insurance funding questions. 19 We use these survey questions to calculate individual bias toward more or less government funding by
where c is the vector of control questions. In model speci…cations 2 and 4 we include Bias on the right-hand side. In all of the models the coe¢ cient on Bias has the expected positive sign and is signi…cant at the 99 percent level. The decline in the predictive power of p and w is insigni…cant; there continues to be a positive relationship between higher levels of insecurity and increased funding for welfare and an increased role for the federal government in reducing inequality. Taken together the results tend to substantiate the hypothesis that workers with higher levels of insecurity demand more funding for social insurance programs, particularly welfare and reducing inequality even after controlling for individual bias. On other hand, our results do not indicate that insecure workers want the government to dedicate more funding toward long-term solutions that should naturally reduce inequality (and insecurity), such as more money for education, but would prefer direct redistribution of income from the rich to the poor.
Conclusion
The data support the hypothesis that increased competition from foreign laboro¤shoring, in particular-has played a signi…cant role in generating worker insecurity. While this …nding is not necessarily new (for the U.K. see Scheve and Slaughter, 2004) , this paper is the …rst to use U.S. data to analyze this issue. Secondly, Rodrik (1997) and Agell (1999) suggest that rising economic insecurity has increased workers' demand for social insurance. Mughan (2007) and Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006) are the only papers, to our knowledge, to empirically test this hypothesis, and present mixed results. The GSS contains characteristics similar to both studies, and our …ndings tend to refute those of Mughan (2007) and corroborate the …ndings of CIR-that objective measures of insecurity play a signi…cant role in forming perceptions and higher levels of insecurity (objective or perspective) cause workers to demand more social insurance. In the process, we substantiate the recent …nding of Campbell et al. (2007) by showing that respondents'past …nancial situation plays a signi…cant role in forming expectations of future job loss. We have; used an expected utility model to show why higher levels of insecurity should lead to a greater demand for social insurance and; estimated the costs of a wage insurance program. The model predicts that the cost of providing wage insurance to all workers is around $30 billion. These costs are much higher than the $16.7 million in wage insurance bene…ts paid to workers in 2006 through the U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program. 20 This program has stringent requirements that requires workers certify (on a layo¤-by-layo¤ approach) that they have been adversely a¤ected by international trade, requirements that drastically increase overhead costs. 21 The wage insurance bene…t is only for workers 50 and older who …nd re-employment within 26 weeks after being laid o¤ from a …rm where a signi…cant portion of the a¤ected workers lacked easily transferable skills. Our results suggest that workers with easily transferable skills will not have a hard time …nding a job with similar pay and bene…ts and therefore will not demand wage insurance, making this requirement di¢ cult to test and unnecessary. 22 From one perspective, providing wage insurance to all workers seems like the best approach to increasing participation; workers in tradable industries and occupations with high levels of industry-speci…c skills will naturally consume the majority of the bene…ts. Moreover, a wage insurance program could be desirable substitute for unemployment assistance because it reduces the duration of unemployment. Reducing unemployment assistance (which had total outlays of over $30 billion in 2006) or diverting resources from protectionist policies (the annual maximum spending on farm subsidies is $23 billion) will pay for such a program.
We have shown that, because of adverse selection, private markets are not likely to accommodate the demand for wage insurance. Agell (1999) notes that if governments are unwilling and/or unable to address these demands, workers will seek protectionism as a method for relieving their insecurity. Recognizing the rise in worker insecurity and addressing the increased demand for social insurance is an important step toward preventing protectionism and preserving future globalization. We leave it to future research to test whether workers that express higher levels of insecurity actually prefer protectionism over free trade.
2 1 According to the GAO (2007), a worker (or group) must …rst …le a petition with the Department of Labor (DOL). Next, the DOL surveys the …rm undergoing the layo¤ and its customers and reviews industry data to determine if the worker (group) meets the criteria for TAA.
2 2 The GAO (2007) also recomends that these certi…cation restrictions be eliminated to increase enrollment. The report also notes that workers must forgo training and unemployment insurance bene…ts to qualify for wage insurance. 
